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Opportunity Organizations and Threat-
Induced Contention: Protest Waves in
Authoritarian Settings1
Paul D. Almeida
Texas A&M University
The article combines two strands of political process theory (op-
portunity and threat) in a changing authoritarian context. Through
the use of protest event, archival, and secondary sources on El Sal-
vador between 1962 and 1981, the study examines the outbreak and
forms of two protest waves that are generated by the temporal
sequencing of political opportunity and threat environments. The
specific opportunities of institutional access and competitive elec-
tions motivate regime challengers to form durable civic organiza-
tions. This newly available organizational infrastructure can be used
to sustain reformist contention in the near term as well as be rad-
icalized to launch more disruptive and violent protest campaigns
when opportunities recede and the political environment transitions
to one characterized by mounting threats (state-attributed economic
problems, erosion of rights, and state repression).
INTRODUCTION
The political process model has reached near canonical stature in the
study of social movements. The theoretical framework focuses on the
specific political opportunities in a movement’s environment that facilitate
collective action by providing incentives such as institutional access, elec-
toral realignments, elite conflict, external allies, and relaxation in state
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repression (Tarrow 1994; McAdam 1996). Yet, even with the recent gains
in explaining social movement emergence and outcomes, we still know
relatively little about these same processes in authoritarian states, which
tend to be much less homogeneous than core democracies (McAdam,
McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1999; Meyer 2002; Wickham 2002;
McAdam 2003).
Scholars taking up the challenge to apply the political process model
in nondemocratic contexts find support for the framework with core po-
litical opportunities associated with changes in protest levels and outcomes
(Cook 1996; Hipsher 1998; Bunce 1999). These important studies often
emphasize authoritarian situations in which a polity experiences a period
of liberalization and/or democratization (Osa 2001). Selecting cases that
allow for variation in the nondemocratic context may yield different
sources and patterns of contention. For example, what conditions are
linked to the outbreak of protest waves in extremely repressive authori-
tarian settings where political opportunities are scarce?
The present article addresses such questions and contributes to social
movement theory by analyzing the temporal sequencing of political op-
portunity, organizational infrastructure, and threat in shaping the level
and form of collective action in a changing authoritarian context. Spe-
cifically, I analyze the onset of two protest waves in El Salvador between
1960 and 1981 (see figs. 1 and 2).2 The study begins with the conceptual
distinction between political opportunity and threat and is followed by a
sequential theoretical model that outlines the shift from an opportunity
environment to a threatening political environment.
DISTINGUISHING THREAT FROM POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY
Tilly’s (1978, pp. 133–38) and Goldstone and Tilly’s (2001) mobilization
models maintain that two general paths drive expanded collective action:
(1) political opportunity and (2) threat. In recent years political opportunity
variables have received much more attention than threat variables in the
social movement literature (see McAdam [1982] 1999, pp. x–xi; Tarrow
2001, p. 12; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, pp. 42–43). In addition,
in standard political process models threat (e.g., state repression) is often
incorporated within the concept of political opportunity as the negative
side of opportunity associated with declining protest (Goldstone and Tilly
2001). However, with the move to extend political process theory to au-
2 I use the term “protest wave” interchangeably with “protest cycle” in this work. Protest
waves or cycles are defined as periods of widespread protest activity across multiple
social groups and often encompass much of the national territory (Tarrow 1989, pp.
48–49).
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Fig. 1.—Reported strikes in El Salvador, 1957–81. (Sources: La Prensa Gra´fica 1962–81;
Molina Are´valo 1988.)
thoritarian contexts, we find that protest is not driven solely by responsive
political institutions and relatively facilitative governments.
In order to analyze the roles of political opportunity and threat di-
mensions in contributing to increased contention we need to conceptually
separate them and develop indicators of threat as political process scholars
have previously done for political opportunity. Tilly (1978) defines op-
portunity as the likelihood that challengers will enhance their interests or
extend existing benefits if they act collectively. In contrast, threat denotes
the probability that existing benefits will be taken away or new harms
inflicted if challenging groups fail to act collectively (Tilly 1978; Koopmans
1995; Jasper 1997; Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Van Dyke and Soule 2002).
Viewing opportunity and threat as ideal types, groups may either be driven
by positive environmental cues and institutional incentives to push for-
ward new demands and extend benefits (i.e., political opportunity) or be
pressed into action in fear of losing current goods, rights, and safety (i.e.,
threat). In the following sections, a sequential theoretical framework is
provided that conceptually links political opportunity and threat to the
outbreak of protest waves in authoritarian settings.3
THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY ENVIRONMENT IN
AUTHORITARIAN SETTINGS
The political opportunity model is largely a theory of protest driven by
a relatively more responsive institutional setting and political context.
3 In the present article political opportunity and threat are treated as distinct (but
sequentially related) political contexts in authoritarian settings. For an excellent the-
oretical discussion and formal model of a “mixed” political environment where various
levels of political opportunity and threat occur simultaneously, see Goldstone and Tilly
(2001).
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Fig. 2.—Forms of protest in El Salvador, 1962–81. Nonviolent conventional protests
were defined as street marches, strikes, public gatherings, demonstrations, petitions, spray-
painting political graffiti, handing out political literature, hunger strikes, and public state-
ments. Mass disruptive protests were coded as occupations of buildings and land, con-
structing barricades, cutting off power, sit-ins, and disseminating political propaganda via
homemade explosives (las bombas de propaganda). Violent protests include armed attacks,
bombings, kidnappings, arson, sabotage, armed occupations of radio stations and towns,
and robberies by political groups. (Source: La Prensa Gra´fica 1962–81)
That is, the political environment opens in a manner conducive to the
pressing of demands by multiple groups (Tarrow 1989; Koopmans 1993;
Mueller 1999; Beissinger 2001). In Tilly’s (1978) initial conceptualization
of opportunity, groups have a greater probability of realizing their interests
or gaining new advantages if they decide to act collectively. The state
and state managers are probably the most important actors in organizing
this changing political environment (Jenkins 1995; Goodwin 1997).
While political opportunities increase the likelihood for movement
emergence in democratic settings, in nondemocratic contexts they first
encourage the formation of challenger organizations. To realize an esca-
lation in protest requires a certain level of such organizational resources
(McCarthy and Zald 1977) and cognitive attributions that assess and
interpret the political environment (Snow et al. 1986; McAdam 1999).
Without organizational structures collective action will likely be short-
lived (Oberschall 1973). Organizational resources include sympathetic in-
stitutions, associational networks, and civic organizations (McCarthy
1996). These informal and formal organizational elements constitute an
organizational infrastructure for multiple groups to link previously un-
connected collectivities, exchange resources and information, and launch
protest campaigns resulting in a protest wave or cycle (Walton and Seddon
1994; Gould 1995; Minkoff 1997; McAdam 1999).
Although various challenger organizations and their building blocks of
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associational networks and sympathetic institutions serve as important
covariates in explaining protest dynamics in democratic settings, their
mere existence must be accounted for in authoritarian contexts where
basic civil liberties and rights of free association have been historically
restricted (Wickham 2002). Two political opportunity dimensions salient
in overcoming these restrictions and encouraging challenger organiza-
tional formation include (1) institutional access and (2) competitive elec-
tions (Tarrow 1989, 1994; Jenkins 1995; Markoff 1996; Linz and Stepan
1996). Below, these two political opportunity dimensions are analyzed in
relation to the emergence of an organizational infrastructure in authori-
tarian settings.
Institutional Access
New laws, state agencies, resource commitments, and symbolic gestures
emitted by liberalizing states to civil society act as positive forces for
disempowered groups (Almeida and Stearns 1998; Amenta and Young
1999). When new laws are passed and written down, they provide an
increasingly stable, predictable, and consistent system of political incen-
tives for challengers to form organizations (Stinchcombe 1965; Weber
1968; McCarthy 1996; Wiktorowicz 2001). Also, officially registering and
legalizing nongovernmental entities (e.g., political parties, labor unions,
professional and civic associations, rural cooperatives) in authoritarian
contexts provide a state-sanctioned and legitimated organizational form
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983) in which to support collective claim making.
A more competitive electoral system ensures the reliability of this widening
institutional access for organization building.
Competitive Elections
One of the most important ways in which authoritarian states vary resides
in the relative openness of the electoral process (Cook 1996; Markoff 1996;
Linz and Stepan 1996). Democratization efforts allowing increasingly com-
petitive elections in authoritarian regimes supply previously excluded
groups with an arena in which to begin organizing drives. These nationally
generalized conditions of permitting relatively open elections contribute
to the formation of organizations and associations by protecting multiple
challengers (Tilly 1978).
By convoking multiparty elections, the ruling political party’s legiti-
macy becomes linked to the election process and outcome. As a result,
severe repression of emerging civic organizations can place state legiti-
macy and future electoral competitiveness in question. The state’s new
incentive to restrain from repressive acts gives challengers the opportunity
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to access organizational resources and sympathetic institutions to found
and maintain new organizations around specific issues affecting their con-
stituencies. Excluded groups calculate that they have a greater chance of
successfully organizing and exerting political pressure without being phys-
ically threatened or extinguished.
Once opposition parties secure some representation in a democratizing
polity, they have an interest in forming alliances with challenging groups
and organizations outside to increase their own electoral power (Prze-
worski 1991; Markoff 1996). Electoral opposition parties may encourage
and view emerging challenger organizations as a vital component of their
own constituency. With allies in the polity, challengers increase the like-
lihood that their investments in organizing result in new advantages and
organizational survival. Boosting challenger organizing efforts include
such opposition party actions as supporting and financing civic organi-
zations, and securing a hearing/parliamentary debate for demands and
more neutral state arbitration for conflicts with the private sector. Chal-
lenger organizations under these conditions want to reform the state, get
new policies, expand existing benefits, or change public attitudes (Tilly
1978; Jenkins and Klandermans 1995; Goldstone 1998). In accord with
this liberalizing trend in state practices and the larger political environ-
ment, more nonviolent and civil forms of protest are predicted since in-
stitutional channels of conflict resolution are more available and legiti-
mated (Goodwin 1997; Goldstone 1998; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).
ORGANIZATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE AS POLITICAL
OPPORTUNITY “HOLDOVERS”
A period of expanded political opportunity in authoritarian contexts also
permits the survival of an organizational infrastructure after the political
opportunities responsible for its emergence diminish. In other words, po-
litical opportunity periods deposit lasting organizational remnants or
“holdovers” that persist in the political environment (Taylor 1989; Meyer
and Whittier 1994; Minkoff 1997). Indeed, the maintenance and survival
of challenger organizations may be the most important outcome of a
political opportunity–generated protest wave in authoritarian contexts.
Such enduring organizations provide a fungible resource infrastructure
from which protest waves may emerge in much different political envi-
ronments. One such political context is that of threat, whereby a set of
negative environmental conditions pushes groups into collective claim
making.
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ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSITION FROM OPPORTUNITY TO THREAT
A political environment that transitions from political opportunity to
threat will likely initially throw the entire social movement sector off
guard. After years of investing time and resources in organizational found-
ing, membership recruitment, and strategies consonant with a liberalizing
authoritarian state, challengers facing a transition to a threatening en-
vironment find that the old ways of organizing and seeking political in-
fluence are inadequate. These challenger sunk costs will likely cause or-
ganizational inertia and a lag effect in responding and adapting to a more
repressive political environment (Stinchcombe 1965; Hannan and Free-
man 1989).
However, if the political environment continues to transition in a con-
sistent direction over time (i.e., a more threatening trajectory), challengers
are once again signaled by the state to change their organizing structures
and strategies. For example, petitioning a national parliament that as-
sumed power via electoral fraud or engaging in orderly street marches
while security forces repeatedly disperse them with live ammunition mo-
tivates well-organized and resourceful challengers to radicalize their or-
ganizational structures and strategies. Having access to a preexisting or-
ganizational infrastructure allows challengers to adopt new organizational
forms and practices (i.e., growth in radical organizations and disruptive
protest) over time in response to a threatening environment.
With an organizational infrastructure already in place, challengers more
easily employ bloc recruitment, while “the presence of numerous organ-
izations ensures a pre-established communications network, resources al-
ready partially mobilized, the presence of individuals with leadership
skills, and a tradition of participation among members of the collectivity”
(Oberschall 1973, p. 125). Without the previous buildup of an organiza-
tional infrastructure or political opportunity “holdovers,” threat-induced
collective action will likely be weak to nonexistent.
THE THREATENING POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
We can partition threat into more precise dimensions. Three principal
threats that apply to authoritarian states in the global periphery include
(1) state-attributed economic problems, (2) erosion of rights, and (3) state
repression (Tilly 1978; Walton and Seddon 1994; Goldstone and Tilly 2001;
Goodwin 2001; Almeida 2002). These forms of threat in most times and
places increase the costs of collective action and deter protest (Tilly 1978;
Jasper 1997). However, if the recipients of these threats are well-organized,
resourceful groups with an elaborate organizational infrastructure, greater
levels of collective action and resistance are expected (Jenkins 1983; Gould
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1991; Walton and Seddon 1994; McAdam 2003). Challenger organizations
boost confidence, exchange information and resources, link disconnected
groups, and provide a collective vehicle to resist unwanted changes via
popular contention. Thus, organizational infrastructures surviving past a
period of political opportunity in which they were founded perform a key
task in determining if threats will deter or escalate collective dissent.
State-Attributed Economic Problems
As the resource mobilization perspective suggests, economic grievances
alone are usually not sufficient to explain escalating levels of contention
since they are ubiquitous while protest is not (McCarthy and Zald 1977;
Jenkins 1983). Nonetheless, when organized groups convincingly attribute
to specific agents the responsibility for a decline in their economic
conditions they may initiate campaigns to resist unwanted changes (e.g.,
middle-class organizations in Argentina—los ahorristas—protesting
throughout 2002 against the loss of their savings accounts because of
state-initiated bank freezes and currency devaluations). The administra-
tive expansion of the nation-state as regulator of economic life and vital
resources makes it a common target for redress of economic problems
(Tilly 1984; Walton and Seddon 1994; Goodwin 1997). Two specific state-
attributed economic problems in the global periphery include land access
(Wickham-Crowley 1992) and basic price increases (Goldstone 1986 and
2001).
When state-sponsored agro-export policies expel peasants from subsis-
tence plots and fail to institute highly publicized agrarian reform or when
basic prices rise abruptly, incentives increase for networked and resource-
ful groups to resist. For example, state-initiated structural adjustment
programs and price increases are likely to trigger severe protests in de-
veloping countries with dense urban populations and high rates of labor
unionization (Walton and Ragin 1990; Walton and Shefner 1994; Auyero
2002). In sum, state-attributed economic problems experienced directly in
the immediate lives of resourceful groups may be a threat incentive to
join in resistant collective action.4 Even though state-attributed economic
problems increase the probability of heightened protest among organized
groups, the form of protest will likely only become more radicalized and
violent when combined with an erosion of rights and escalating state
repression.
4 Tilly (1978) originally gives the examples of rural resistance to tax collection and land
dispossession as episodes of threat-induced collective action (i.e., state-attributed eco-
nomic problems). In more recent works, analysts have focused more on the threat of
state repression (Goldstone and Tilly 2001).
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Erosion of Rights
After a period of extending civil rights, taking away voting and a sense
of citizenship blocks the conventional means to individual political par-
ticipation (Useem 1985; Olzak, Beasley, and Olivier 2003). Alternative,
nonconventional political strategies and organizations appear much more
attractive under these circumstances (Amenta and Young 1999). In par-
ticular, when competitive national elections are nullified, canceled, and/
or perceived as fraudulent and meaningless, the state announces the clo-
sure of the polity on a national scale and calls into question its legitimacy.
This sends a strong message to challenger organizations that the state as
an audience and arbiter to reform-type demands is greatly restricted (if
not outright hostile). Over time, challengers will likely use their in-place
organizational infrastructure to form extraparliamentary and revolution-
ary organizations and attempt more disruptive and violent strategies to
exercise political influence. Unresponsive state managers that are per-
ceived to be no longer publicly accountable drive this radicalization in
the form of protest, when petitioning authorities through routine conflict
resolution channels appears futile (White 1989; Goodwin 1997; Jenkins
and Bond 2001).
State Repression
State repression may also be a critical component in igniting further pro-
test. A number of empirical studies outside of advanced industrialized
democracies have shown positive effects of state repression on aggregate
and group-specific protest activities (Olivier 1991; Khawaja 1993; Fran-
cisco 1995; Rasler 1996; Loveman 1998; Schock 1999; Moore 2000; Beis-
singer 2001). State repression may generate moral shocks and suddenly
imposed grievances for both the general public and activist groups (White
1989; Loveman 1998; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Wood 2003).
Coercive state behavior breaks publicly held norms of expected state–
civil society relations—especially when the repressive acts are way out of
proportion to the type of demands and claims protesters pursue (Goldstone
1998).
Activists can use state repressive acts as empirical verifications of the
unworthiness of state managers to rule as well as for motivational appeals
within organizations and interorganizational units to participate in future
protest actions. These organizational settings provide solidary incentives,
normative pressures, and shared activist identities to engage in high-risk
protest (Loveman 1998; Snow and McAdam 2000; Petersen 2001).5 In
5 The sense of harm, though, has upper boundaries on escalating protest. At some
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addition, repressive acts grant occasions for emotionally charged focal
events, such as funeral processions and homage ceremonies for fallen
victims of state violence, to rally challengers.6 State repression, as erosion
of rights, also pushes well-networked challengers into more radical forms
of organization and dissent as repeated outrageous acts of state violence
convince challengers that a fundamental reorganization of the state and
society is a desirable goal (Brockett 1993; Goodwin 1997; Goldstone 1998).
THEORETICAL SUMMARY: TWO PATHS TO PROTEST WAVES
Figure 3 summarizes the temporal relationships conditioning alternate
pathways to protest waves in authoritarian contexts. The schematic model
should be viewed as a probabilistic causal chain (Ganz 2000; Tilly 2002)
that sequentially links political opportunity, organizational infrastructure,
and threats to the outbreak of protest waves. An authoritarian regime
that liberalizes with institutional access and competitive elections (i.e.,
time 1) brings about the development of an organizational infrastructure
(i.e., formation and legalization of civic organizations, cooperatives, and
unions). As challengers interpret the relatively positive cues emitted from
the opening political environment, they use their newly formed organi-
zational infrastructure and launch protest campaigns leading to the out-
break of a protest wave. Under these conditions, multiple groups press
the state for new advantages and benefits, using more orderly and non-
violent tactics.
When political opportunities contract and the protest wave descends,
an organizational infrastructure is left in place (i.e., opportunity “hold-
overs”). If, following the political opportunity–induced protest episode,
challengers receive consistent environmental feedback indicating that the
political climate has shifted to one potentially more injurious if they fail
to mobilize (i.e., loss of goods, rights, and safety in time 2), they are
motivated to adapt their organizational infrastructure to the threatening
environment over time and create more radical organizations. Once the
organizational infrastructure is radicalized, another protest wave is trig-
point protest will likely appear too dangerous as the state’s repressive actions turn
outrage into fear (Brockett 1993). Much of the large-sample, cross-national literature
on state repression and political violence finds evidence for a curvilinear relationship
with semirepressive regimes generating the highest levels of political discontent (Muller
1985; Muller and Seligson 1987; Boswell and Dixon 1990; Muller and Weede 1994).
6 The three largest protest campaigns in Argentina in 2002 took place in Buenos Aires
on June 27, July 3, and December 20 to publicly denounce the police killings on June
26 of two unemployed protesters (los piqueteros) (Ferna´ndez Moores 2002) and com-
memorate the one-year anniversary of the 28 antiausterity protesters killed in late
December 2001.
Fig. 3.—Pathways to protest wave outbreaks in authoritarian settings
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gered by repeated threat incentives. Radical challenger organizations em-
ploy more disruptive and violent forms of protest as institutional channels
to defend rights erode and state repression decreases the national gov-
ernment’s credibility.
DATA AND METHODS
This study employs a dynamic political process method that tracks
changes over time (Gamson and Meyer 1996) in El Salvador’s political
environment to explain variations in the level and form of protest activity.
The analysis centers on the sequential relationship between political op-
portunity, organizational infrastructure, and threat in generating the out-
break of protest waves. The case draws on protest events collected and
coded from the daily El Salvadoran newspaper La Prensa Gra´fica between
1962 and 1981.7 The number of protest events identified and coded over
the 20-year period (January 1, 1962–December 31, 1981) totaled 4,151.
Protest events were defined as collective challenges of three or more people
making claims on political or economic elites (Rucht and Ohlemacher
1992; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1996). Protests were coded into 25
different forms, ranging from petitions and street marches to factory oc-
cupations and armed attacks. Other properties of the protest events were
also coded, including use of conventional nonviolence, disruption and
violence by protesters, and presence and type of challenger organization(s)
in protest events.
TWO PROTEST WAVES COMPARED
El Salvador, 1932 to mid-1960s
Between 1932 and the mid-1960s El Salvador’s political system was re-
stricted to conservative military governance (Guidos Ve´jar 1980; Baloyra
1982; Wood 2000; Mahoney 2001). The military regime originated in 1932
in the context of a peasant uprising in the western coffee-growing de-
partments. The security forces swiftly suppressed the revolt and carried
out in retribution a massacre of a reported 8,000–30,000 peasants in a
three-week period (Anderson 1970; Zamosc 1989; Pe´rez Brignoli 1995;
Paige 1997). Following the massacre, from the 1930s to the mid-1960s,
there were only sporadic outbreaks of urban unrest. Though at times
large enough to bring down the existing government and usher in a new
7 When La Prensa Gra´fica was unavailable or additional information was needed about
a particular event, a Salvadoran newspaper—Diario Latino, El Diario de Hoy, El
Mundo, or El Tiempo—was used.
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military regime (e.g., 1944 and 1960; Turcios 1993), popular contention
never lasted for more than a few months. Restrictions on union organi-
zation, noncompetitive elections, general fear in the countryside, and a
series of quasimartial laws and state repressive actions (e.g., 1944–48,
1952–56, 1960, and 1961) prevented the formation of durable civic or-
ganizations (Ları´n 1972). For example, the urban labor movement failed
on several occasions to form an enduring labor federation after the 1932
crackdown (Ları´n 1972).8 The political climate, though, changed in the
mid-1960s, becoming favorable to the emergence of an organizational
infrastructure capable of sustaining multiple social movements.
Political Opportunities in El Salvador, 1960–72
Institutional access.—The Salvadoran military regime that emerged in
the early 1960s was under enormous international and domestic pressure
to implement moderately reformist measures. Its liberalizing efforts could
most clearly be observed in the institutional access it provided to three
key sectors of civil society: (1) the labor sector, (2) the educational sector,
and (3) the church sector. The national government promoted a number
of unprecedented initiatives in the sphere of state-labor relations. The
state provided greater autonomy and investment in the educational sector
by expanding the public education system and legalizing school teachers’
associations. In the church sector, the state actively supported the for-
mation of cooperative associations allowing entry to the Catholic Church
in the countryside. This increasing institutional access (along with mul-
tiparty elections) encouraged a dramatic upsurge in the formation of civic
organizations in all three social sectors.
Labor sector access.—To better regulate the industrialization process,
the Salvadoran state revised and instituted a number of labor laws in the
early 1960s that acted as a catalyst for the mobilization of urban labor
organizations. In 1962 the liberalizing Rivera military regime allowed
governmental and semigovernmental employees the right to form asso-
ciations with state recognition (Molina Are´valo 1988; Arriola Palomares
and Candray Alvarado 1994). In 1963, Rivera enacted a labor code. Un-
precedented for modern El Salvador, a set of legalized labor standards
was put into place in which worker grievances could be settled (Arriola
Palomares and Candray Alvarado 1994). The labor code recognized the
right to form labor federations and confederations as well as a jurisdic-
tional body (ministry of labor and labor courts) in which to place claims
8 The Salvadoran labor and legal historian Augusto Ları´n (1972, p. 18) states that
between 1932 and 1944 (during the General Martı´nez dictatorship) even mentioning
the words “labor union” could be considered a public offense.
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for adjudication. These opening gestures in the sphere of state-labor re-
lations reactivated a number of clandestine and semilegal union confed-
erations (CGTS, CGS; see app. table A1 for full names and translations
of acronyms) and were responsible for the foundation of several new labor
federations and unions organizations (e.g., FUSS, STISSS, STUS, SETA,
FESTIAVTCES, UNOC, FESINCONTRANS). Table 1 summarizes the
principal legislative actions in the early 1960s opening the way for urban
labor organization.
The Law of Collective Labor Conflicts, passed in 1961, created the
potential that the state would become a more neutral arbiter in disputes
with private employers. The right of public employees to unionize also
mobilized thousands of teachers, social security institute workers, state-
industry and administration workers, and university workers to form
union organizations and associations in the mid to late 1960s. Legislation
authorizing the right of urban workers to strike was ratified in the 1962
constitution as well as in the labor code of 1963. This legally sanctioned
an important pressure tactic for urban workers. With these state actions,
the size of the union sector grew considerably in the 1960s. In 1960 there
were 64 unions with 21,000 affiliates and by 1971 there were 127 unions
with 64,186 members (Menjı´var 1982; Molina Are´valo 1988).
Educational sector access.—A major institution in Salvadoran society
historically supporting oppositional activity is the National University of
El Salvador (UES) (Parkman 1988; Grenier 1999). In 1950 the national
government implemented a university autonomy law that was not acti-
vated until the elections of the 1960s (Webre 1979; security forces invaded
and occupied the university in 1952 and 1960). In the 1960s, the central
government permitted self-management of the university with little in-
terference (Grenier 1999). As part of the state’s liberalization drive in the
1960s, it greatly increased funding for postsecondary education. In 1960,
the national government budget for higher education was $800,000 and
it grew to over $6.5 million by 1970 (U.S. AID 1973). The proportion of
the total education budget allocated to universities also grew significantly
in these same years, from 7% to 22% (U.S. AID 1973).
In the context of these new state resource commitments to higher ed-
ucation, university student enrollment expanded markedly. Between 1955
and 1968, the university student population more than quadrupled, from
1,393 to 6,500 students (Wickham Crowley 1989; Valle 1993). The UES
also relocated its academic schools previously dispersed throughout the
capital to a centralized location in a northern San Salvador suburb
(Ciudad Universitaria). The physical size of the new main campus tripled
between 1963 and 1968 (Valle 1993).
In addition, new UES campuses opened in Santa Ana in 1965 and San
Miguel in 1969—the second and third largest cities in the nation. In 1965
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TABLE 1
National Labor Legislation Promoting Institutional Access
Law or Legal Action
Year of
Enactment
Labor Tribunal Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1960
Law of Collective Labor Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . 1961
Revision of Retirement and Pensions Law . . . 1961
Legalization of Public Employees to Form
Unions/Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1962
Right of Urban Workers to Strike . . . . . . . . . . . . 1962, 1963
Right of Unions to Form Federations and
Confederations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1963
Source.—Molina Are´valo (1988).
the Jesuit-run Catholic university (Universidad Centroamericana Jose´ Si-
meo´n Can˜as) was founded in the capital as a public corporation and
reached an enrollment of more than 1,300 students by 1970 (Beirne 1996).
Instead of counting the number of potentially mobilizable university stu-
dents in the hundreds on a small, single decentralized campus, as in the
pre-1960s, students now numbered in the thousands in four centralized
universities in the three largest cities. This development created favorable
ecological conditions for the building of university-based organizations
(Zhao 1998).
The government also nearly tripled its investment in primary and sec-
ondary public education between 1960 and 1970, from a budget of $9.14
million to a budget of $26.58 million (U.S. AID 1973). In this same period,
the number of enrolled junior high and high school students more than
doubled (U.S. AID 1973). During this rapid educational expansion, the
state tolerated the formation of public sector teachers’ associations, whose
leadership had in part been exiled after a 1961 military coup.
Church sector access.—Beyond the new urban labor laws and educa-
tional expansion, institutional access spread to the countryside via the
Catholic Church. In the 1960s, the central government started to en-
courage the formation of rural cooperative associations, giving increased
jurisdiction and resources for this purpose to the Ministry of Agriculture
and the Regional Colonization Institute (Guerra Calderon 1976). At the
same time, the state permitted the Catholic Church to initiate cooperatives
in rural zones with small landholders and poor peasants. The government
granted legal recognition to the Catholic Church Cooperative program in
1967 (FUNPROCOOP) and formed its own cooperative institute in 1969
(INSAFOCOOP; Guerra Calderon 1976). Though modest in intentions,
the cooperative programs, according to one participant observer, “broke
the ice of fear, distrust, and passivity” that had existed between the peas-
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antry and the state since the 1932 massacre (Guerra Calderon 1976, p.
231).
In 1961, the church formed the Inter-Diocesan Social Secretariat (ISS),
which was funded by the central government from 1962 to 1967 (Vega
1994). The ISS sponsored rural cooperatives for small landowning and
landless peasants under the FUNPROCOOP program (Guerra Calderon
1976). Church-sponsored cooperatives spread rapidly, starting in 1963
with 98 members in 2 cooperatives and reaching 37 cooperatives in 1969
with 10,500 members; by 1971 there were 54 cooperatives (Guerra Cal-
deron 1976). In these cooperatives, peasants learned valuable farming and
leadership skills, while at the same time they received training in com-
munity organizing and civil rights (Vega 1994). The church also used the
legal protection of the cooperative program as a springboard to organize
peasant leagues, Christian base communities, and peasant training cen-
ters. The opening electoral system added another layer of pressure on the
state to sustain institutional access in the labor, educational, and church
sectors.
Competitive elections.—In 1963, following 32 years of one-party mili-
tary rule, the Salvadoran government changed the electoral system to
proportional representation—partly as a result of Colonel Rivera’s em-
barrassment at running unopposed in the 1962 presidential elections as
well as pressure brought to bear by the newly formed Partido Demo´crata
Cristiana (Christian Democratic Party, or PDC, founded in 1960). The
new proportional system allotted a fixed number of national deputies (the
equivalent of U.S. House and Senate seats) in El Salvador’s unicameral
legislative assembly to each of the 14 departments (the equivalent of U.S.
states) based on its population size. This dramatically transformed the
system of political competition for nearly a decade.
The 1964 parliamentary elections staged the first test for the new system
of proportional representation. The oppositional PDC performed strongly,
winning 14 seats in the unicameral legislature and taking the mayorship
in the nation’s capital, San Salvador. Table 2 illustrates the increasing
electoral strength of opposition parties (especially the Christian Demo-
crats) in the parliamentary elections between 1950 and 1970. At the local
level the opposition parties made inroads as well. In 1968, the Christian
Democrats won the mayoral races in the three largest cities. The opening
of the electoral system was a trend that continued until the presidential
and legislative assembly elections in the first quarter of 1972 (Gordon
1989). It marked a sharp break from the personalist military rule of Gen-
eral Martı´nez (1931–44) and the one-party rule of the PRUD and PCN
military governments up to 1964—a period Rube´n Zamora (1998, p. 26)
calls monopartidismo (“one partyism”).
Under the new context of competitive elections, opposition parties en-
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TABLE 2
Political Party Representation in Salvadoran National
Assembly, 1950–70 (by Absolute Number of Deputies)
Deputy’s Party
Year
1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1961 1964 1966 1968 1970
PRUD/PCN* . . . 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 32 31 27 34
PDC† . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 15 19 16
PAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4
PPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 1
PREN . . . . . . . . . . . 1
MNR . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
UDN . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Total . . . . . . . . . . 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 52 52 52 52
Sources.—McDonald (1969) and Webre (1979).
* The military party.
† Christian Democrats.
couraged the formation of challenger organizations as supportive con-
stituencies outside the polity. The opposition parties such as the PDC,
PAR, and MNR often used their new power in the parliament to call
hearings and investigations supporting challenger organization demands
(e.g., labor codes, promotional systems, university budgets, retirement
packages, rural unionization, and land reform) and they served as ad-
vocates for worker and teacher organizations during these groups’ strike
campaigns. In September 1964, newly elected oppositional politicians be-
gan to lobby for a national teachers’ pension plan as part of a larger
debate on a retirement system for government employees (Ruiz Abarca
1967). This action assisted in the foundation of the public school teachers’
union (ANDES-21 de Junio) by unifying teachers around the content of
the retirement plan.
During the mid-1960s, the Christian Democratic Party played a leading
role with the church in founding or greatly expanding Catholic-based
organizations such as the Catholic university (Whitfield 1994), a labor
union (UNOC), a peasant federation (FECCAS), youth organizations in
the city and countryside (JEC, JOC, and JAC), neighborhood action as-
sociations, and university student organizations (ACUS and FRUSC).
Emerging challenger organizations also benefited from the relative respite
in state repression, owing to the necessity for the official government party
to remain competitive in elections and protect its public image.
In sum, the liberalization of the military regime ushered in two key
political opportunities in the form of institutional access and competitive
elections, which provided incentives and a protective cover allowing the
labor, educational, and church sectors to establish civic organizations. In
the late 1960s, excluded social sectors that had suffered from ongoing
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repressive state actions over the previous 30 years found that they could
sustain themselves via the legalization of their organizations and support
from newly elected oppositional political parties.
Birth of an Organizational Infrastructure
By the end of the 1960s, regime liberalization motivated political activists
to form a wide variety of civic organizations in workplaces, schools, and
churches to press for political and economic reform. These nascent chal-
lenger organizations learned to develop long-term and reciprocal network
relationships with one another (Powell 1990). The increase in organiza-
tional foundation and interorganizational relationships constituted an or-
ganizational infrastructure in the labor, educational, and church sectors.
Labor sector organizations.—Both the progovernment labor confeder-
ation (CGS) and the smaller communist-influenced labor confederation
(CGTS) were formed in the late 1950s and secured legal recognition by
the mid-1960s. In 1965, the fledgling CGTS merged with seven indepen-
dent unions to form the Federacio´n Unitaria Sindical de El Salvador
(FUSS). The CGTS was a semiclandestine labor organization since its
emergence in 1957 and frequently persecuted by security forces. In the
fall of 1965, in an unprecedented move, the liberalizing military govern-
ment gave legal recognition to the FUSS, which led or was involved in
most of the major urban strikes between 1967 and 1972. In 1965 FUSS
had only 14 affiliated unions, but by 1971 it had 24 with more than 9,500
members (Menjı´var 1982; Carpio 1982). The FUSS leadership sensed that
the opening electoral process offered a favorable occasion to test how far
it could push demands for its affiliates in the urban working class. Indeed,
within FUSS a subunit was organized called Comite´ Obrero de Accio´n
Polı´tica (COAP). The purpose of COAP was to infiltrate proregime unions,
direct protest activities, and campaign for opposition candidates in the
1966, 1967, and 1968 parliamentary and presidential elections (Menjı´var
1982).
In 1968 FUSS also encouraged the development of a second militant
trade union organization: the Federation of Workers in Food, Clothing,
Textile, and Related Industries (FESTIAVTCES). By 1971, FUSS and
FESTIAVTCES together controlled 41 unions. In the early 1970s, they
mobilized rural workers in favor of unionization and founded a peasant
organization (ATACES). Using stipulations in the 1963 labor code, other
public sector employees in this period established unions such as the
national university workers (STUS) in 1966 (Valle 1993) and, in 1968, the
Water and Aqueduct Service Employees (SETA), Municipal Employees
(AGEPYM), Social Security Workers (STISSS), and Electrical Workers
(STIES), and in 1972 the Hydroelectric Commission Workers (STECEL)
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(Richter 1980; Bollinger 1987). The legal recognition alone of these newly
created unions by the state was a major victory. Ten years prior, left-of-
center unions had had virtually no legal standing while many labor leaders
were in exile (Webre 1979).
Educational sector organizations.—In the university sector, the main
student organization, the Asociacio´n General de Estudiantes Universi-
tarios Salvadoren˜os (AGEUS), increased its ranks with the government’s
university expansion program. Groups within AGEUS showed signs of
political differentiation with the formation of such organizations as the
communist-influenced Frente Estudiantiles Universitarios Revoluciona-
rios (FEUR), Catholic students in the Federacio´n Revolucionaria de Univ-
ersitarios Social Cristianos (FRUSC) and Accio´n Cato´lica Universitaria
Salvadoren˜a (ACUS), and the social democratic Frente Socialista De-
mo´crata (FSD). These organizations established subunits in each of the
seven academic colleges of the national university (Valle 1993). By the
end of the 1960s even high school students formed organizations such as
El Consejo General de Bienestar Estudiantil (CGBE) and La Asociacio´n
de los Estudiantes de Secundaria (AES).
One of the most important challenger organizations to form in the 1960s
was the public school teachers’ union, La Asociacio´n Nacional de Edu-
cadores Salvadoren˜os (ANDES–21 de Junio). ANDES began internally
organizing in 1964 and made a public presence in 1965, when an estimated
11,000 teachers marched (dressed in their finest attire) through San Sal-
vador to the presidential palace demanding their own teacher-specific
retirement system and exclusion from the government’s general program
for state employees. Symbolically planned, the mass street march occurred
a day before the traditional teacher’s day, June 22, and hence, the teachers
named their new organization ANDES–21 de Junio. Two years later (in
June 1967), ANDES-21 received legal recognition from the national gov-
ernment. The formation and self-entitlement of ANDES-21 signified a
move toward greater autonomy for public education workers.
The new teachers’ organization had the support of more than 80% of
the 10,000–14,000 teachers working in El Salvador at the time. ANDES-
21 organized nationally, with regional organizations in each of El Sal-
vador’s 14 departments. The association evidenced a strong break with
the past; previous military governments had carried on a paternalistic
relationship with public educators, busing them en masse into the capital
for progovernment parades and election rallies (Anaya Montes 1972;
Bevan 1981). ANDES-21 also organized the first national high school
student organizations between 1968 and 1971 (CGBE and AES).
Church sector organizations.—The Catholic Church was motivated to
form organizations via the government’s rural cooperative program and
its close relations with the newly elected Christian Democratic Party
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(PDC) in parliament and city governments. In 1964 the Catholic Church
and the PDC reactivated the Catholic UNOC and founded a federation
of peasant leagues (FECCAS) that would become a focal organization for
widespread rural protest in the 1970s. FECCAS held a series of annual
peasant conferences beginning in 1965. During these gatherings, FECCAS
publicly pressured the state for land reform and the right to form rural
unions (Guerra Calderon 1976). FECCAS grew to about a thousand mem-
bers by 1970.
The Archdiocese of San Salvador in collaboration with the Christian
Democratic Party created the organization Centro de Estudios Sociales y
Promocio´n Popular (CESPROP; 1967–72), which trained youth groups to
work in urban shantytowns and in the countryside (with FECCAS). CES-
PROP also published a number of reports supporting social reforms such
as land redistribution and peasant unionization. Using the new access
points in the countryside, priests and pastoral teams arrived in rural
communities where they organized peasants in Las Comunidades Cris-
tianas de Base (CCBs). The CCBs performed traditional religious prac-
tices (e.g., singing, praying, and reading scripture) with active peasant
participation. In these small and intimate organizational settings (of 10
to 30 people) new interpretations of biblical passages emerged that pro-
vided the moral and spiritual bases to seek greater social and economic
parity in the everyday lives of El Salvador’s urban and rural poor (Wood
2003). In 1970 the Archdiocese of San Salvador sponsored the Semana
Pastoral (Pastoral Week) where it committed itself to forming Christian
base communities nationally, meeting periodically to coordinate these ef-
forts, and to publishing newsletters sharing CCB experiences around the
country.
A related organizational product of the new commitment of the Catholic
Church to the rural poor was the formation between 1968 and 1972 of
seven major peasant-training centers (Vega 1994). An estimated 15,000
peasants received technical and religious training (theology of the new
social doctrine) in the centers (Montgomery 1982). By the late 1960s and
early to mid 1970s, as an outgrowth of the church cooperatives, peasant
leagues, CCBs, and rural training centers, peasants were beginning to
organize around land and unionization issues.
Political Opportunity Deposits Enduring Organizational Infrastructure
By the late 1960s, under the encouragement of widening institutional
access and protection of the liberalizing electoral system, challengers used
sympathetic institutions and organizations in the labor, educational, and
church sectors to create an unprecedented network of civic organizations
and associations. This organizational infrastructure was accessible to
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groups (especially unionized workers, teachers, students, and a growing
number of church-organized peasants) to draw upon and initiate social
movement protest campaigns. The newly established organizational in-
frastructure permitted by expanded political opportunity culminated in
the outbreak of a protest wave between 1967 and 1972—the longest period
of sustained contention since the late 1920s and early 1930s.
Political Opportunity–Driven Protest Wave, 1967–72
Between 1967 and 1972 popular contention increased, as witnessed by
the total number of strikes and protest events, which eventuated in a full-
blown protest wave (see figs. 1 and 2). The most important outcome of
this protest wave was that multiple challenger organizations and groups
learned how to maintain the organizational infrastructure permitted by
expanding political opportunity. Another feature of the 1967–72 protest
wave was its orderly and nonviolent character (see fig. 2). Popular con-
tention focused on pushing the state to pass new reforms or alter existing
policies. Between 1965 and 1971 nearly one out of every five protest events
targeted the legislative assembly, which challenger organizations viewed
as legitimate and autonomous enough to receive movement demands and
at times pass favorable legislation.
The 1967–72 protest wave began with a series of bus drivers’ strikes
and teacher mobilizing efforts from 1965 to 1967 (organized by FUSS and
ANDES-21). A string of urban labor strikes in the first third of 1967 shook
San Salvador, Santa Ana, and Zacatecoluca, terminating with a progres-
sive general strike in April involving 35,000 workers (Carpio 1980). The
general labor strike enlisted the public support of student and peasant
organizations. In late 1967 and early 1968, ANDES-21 unleashed a major
public school teachers’ strike targeting the Ministry of Education and
Legislative Assembly to consider a teacher-proposed retirement program.
The 58-day teachers’ strike included several mass marches of over 20,000
protesters (some reaching over 80,000); a month-long occupation of the
patio in front of the National Library, where the Ministry of Education
offices were housed; and several solidarity strikes by FUSS-affiliated
unions. This particular campaign was reportedly the largest protest mo-
bilization to date in modern El Salvador (Monteforte Toledo 1972).
There was a lull in contentious activity during the second half of 1969,
which was linked to hostilities between El Salvador and Honduras. Major
challenger organizations such as FUSS and AGEUS temporarily placed
their resources into supporting the government’s war mobilization efforts.
Labor activities and gains occurred in 1969, nevertheless, as Richter (1980,
p. 123) reports from research using FUSS primary documents: “During
the first eight months of 1969 there were thirteen major strikes in El
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Salvador and several related job actions, of which eight were won outright
by the workers—a fact that indicates a continued escalation of the level
of trade-union struggle and organization.”
During the summer of 1971, ANDES-21 initiated another major two-
month-long teachers’ strike, demanding a modernized salary scale cor-
responding to rank and seniority—which again included numerous mass
marches and the pacific occupation of the Palacio Nacional during par-
liamentary debate on the salary legislation. The 1971 teachers’ strike
tapped into the organizational infrastructure support of Catholic labor
unions, public sector unions, high school and university student associ-
ations, oppositional political parties, and even the incipient peasant move-
ment (Anaya Montes 1972). The university community raised $5,200 for
the teachers and donated their printing services to publish ANDES-21
pamphlets and newspapers (Anaya Montes 1972), while thousands of
church-organized peasants in Suchitoto protested and secured the release
of arrested teachers held in the local jail (Pearce 1986).
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, in addition to protests by urban
workers and teachers, student organizations began to sustain protest (as
opposed to intermittent outbursts) as part of a larger protest wave. First,
university student organizations supported the major strikes of ANDES-
21 in the form of solidarity strikes, marches, and fundraising drives. Anaya
Montes (1972) reports that up to 80% of UES students were actively
supporting the ANDES-21 strike in the summer of 1971. UES student
organizations launched their own strikes and building occupations be-
tween 1970 and 1972, in protest over how general education requirements
(areas comunes) were implemented. Even the traditional student bufo
marches (costume parades lampooning government officials; Dunkerly
1982) were now taking place on the streets outside of the newly created
UES campuses in the cities of Santa Ana and San Miguel, providing
stinging political satire well beyond the capital.
The long dormant peasantry benefited from widening political oppor-
tunity created by attempts of the church, labor unions, and opposition
political parties to press the liberalizing state to extend the right to unionize
to rural workers (Ları´n 1972). Most importantly, peasants profited from
the Catholic Church’s rural cooperative program and from the founda-
tion of the Christian Federation of Peasants (FECCAS) in 1964. In turn,
FECCAS-affiliated peasants publicly supported the 1967 general labor
strike and the ANDES-21 teachers’ strikes (Guerra Calderon 1976; Car-
denal 1987).
The protest wave rapidly descended in 1972 after mass protests against
the electoral fraud of presidential and parliamentary elections. The failure
of these mass-based nonviolent protests to prevent electoral fraud threw
the entire organizational infrastructure off balance in terms of developing
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a viable strategy to exercise political influence in a transitioning political
environment. As political opportunities contracted with electoral obstruc-
tion and narrowing institutional access in the early to mid 1970s, there
were markedly fewer inducements to initiate social movement activity.
However, the organizational infrastructure founded in the labor, educa-
tional, and church-based sectors persisted, creating the potential for sub-
sequent rounds of mobilization if pushed by new incentives from the state.
Environmental Transition from Opportunity to Threat
The period from mid-1972 to 1981 was one in which the threats of state-
attributed economic problems, erosion of rights, and state repression in-
creasingly characterized El Salvador’s political environment. Beginning
in 1972, the key political opportunities driving the 1960s’ wave of protest,
institutional access and the practice of competitive elections, narrowed.
This contraction in political opportunity effectively ended the 1967–72
wave of protest and dampened the level of contentious activity between
mid-1972 and 1976 (see figs. 1 and 2). In place of political opportunity,
rising threats began to push challengers to radicalize their organizational
infrastructure. By 1977, the combination of mounting threats with the
dominance of revolutionary organizations in the social movement sector
contributed to a much more disruptive and violent cycle of protest.
Declining Political Opportunities, 1972–81
Institutional access.—Between 1972 and 1977 the Salvadoran regime nar-
rowed the institutional access that it opened to challenger organizations
in the labor, education, and church sectors in the 1960s. By the mid-1970s,
only labor, peasant, and civic organizations closely aligned with the ruling
military party (PCN) enjoyed institutional access or received support from
state agencies. State controlled peasant groups and construction unions
held the largest demonstrations and strikes in the period between 1973
and 1976 (Lungo 1987). The ruling military party tried to form a cor-
poratist base while excluding organizations that had participated in the
1967–72 protest wave, such as the independent students’ and teachers’
associations and the center-left unions. By 1977, with the state’s inability
to implement a moderate land reform proposal and the ascendancy of
General Humberto Romero (formerly the minister of defense and public
security) to the presidency, the attempt at narrow corporatism had failed
and the official military party focused much more on state repression than
on co-optation or restricted institutional access (Guidos Ve´jar 1979; Stan-
ley 1996). Institutional access also became more meaningless with the
closing of multiparty elections.
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Competitive elections.—In late 1971, the three left-of-center opposition
parties (UDN, MNR, and PDC) united forces in an electoral coalition
(Unio´n Nacional Opositora, or UNO) for the upcoming presidential elec-
tions in February 1972. The 1972 elections were of colossal political im-
portance because it was a scheduled year in which presidential, legislative,
and local elections all took place within three weeks of each other. Pre-
occupied with a potential UNO electoral victory, the ruling military party
returned to using the Comisio´n Central de las Elecciones (CCE)—in which
it had appointed all three directors—the national police, and the National
Guard to obstruct electoral participation, imitating the military regimes
before the mid-1960s. In February 1972 the opposition coalition reportedly
won the presidential elections, but, according to a detailed study by the
newly created Catholic University, the ruling military party (PCN) com-
mitted electoral obstruction and refused to investigate the opposition’s
allegations of fraud (Hernandez Pico et al. 1973).9
On March 12, 1972, during parliamentary elections, 74,000 voters de-
faced their ballots in San Salvador in protest of the CCE decision to
disqualify UNO candidates running for the legislature in the departments
of San Salvador, Sonsonate, San Miguel, San Vicente, and La Unio´n
(Hernandez Pico et al. 1973; El Diario de Hoy, March 15, 1972, pp. 2,
55). The opposition used a technical loophole in the electoral code that
stated if a majority of null ballots were cast, the election would be voided.
However, the CCE refused to decertify the parliamentary elections and
the PCN gained a large parliamentary majority through electoral obstruc-
tion. In a three-week period (February 20–March 12, 1972) the Salvadoran
state effectively erased more than eight years of unprecedented political
liberalization via competitive elections. By implementing a number of
electoral manipulations, the state initiated the gradual closure of the po-
litical system at the national level by impeding both the presidential and
parliamentary elections.
After the fraudulent 1972 presidential and assembly elections, UNO
remained in the parliament as a marginalized legal opposition. UNO had
8 deputies between 1972 and 1974. In the 1974 parliamentary elections
UNO gained 15 assembly seats, though the official results were never
publicly released (Webre 1979) and widespread fraud was reported during
balloting (Dunkerly 1982). UNO boycotted the 1976 elections after the
CCE once again attempted to block the registration of its candidates in
the largest cities. Between 1972 and 1978 the official military party em-
ployed a variety of tactics to prevent opposition parties from either gaining
9 At least three massive public demonstrations and a general strike attempt were held
in late February 1972 to protest the electoral fraud. These would be the largest acts
of civil disobedience until the late 1970s.
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a parliamentary majority or winning the executive. These tactics included
using the electoral commission to change vote totals and decertify op-
position party candidates, ballot stuffing at the local level, and extralegal
intimidation of opposition members. The reduction in electoral compet-
itiveness was also closely associated with an erosion of rights and in-
creasing levels of state repression during this period. The orderly forms
of protest, such as strikes, marches, and massive public rallies, that char-
acterized the 1967–72 protest wave proved ineffective in confronting the
regime as it deliberalized. This changed the dynamic of popular move-
ment–state interaction for the remainder of the decade, as the political
environment shifted from opportunity to threat.
Political Opportunity Organizations in a Transitioning Environment
Despite the contraction in political opportunities that attended the nar-
rowing of institutional access and fraudulent elections, the organizational
infrastructure established in the late 1960s endured in the shifting political
environment of the early to mid-1970s. The key social sectors benefiting
from political opportunity in labor, education, and church-sponsored cir-
cles were largely able to keep their organizations and ongoing relationships
intact regardless of fewer incentives to engage in orderly protest for new
benefits and advantages. These political opportunity holdovers provided
the building blocks for the more radical and revolutionary organizational
infrastructure emerging in the mid to late 1970s. Observing the evolution
of each of the three key social sectors from the early to mid 1970s dem-
onstrates their organizational persistence.
Labor sector organizations.—By the mid-1970s, the traditional progov-
ernment trade union federation (CGS) lost support as multiple unions
broke off, forming federations and confederations with a more radical
leadership such as FENASTRAS and CUTS (Arriola Palomares and Can-
dray Alvarado 1994). By 1976 the CGS accounted for only 19% of
unionized workers, down from 42% in 1971 (Dunkerley 1982). El Sal-
vadoran Ministry of Labor data demonstrate that by the mid-1970s the
majority of union membership was affiliated with autonomous, left-of-
center unions (Anner 1996). Many of the unions that joined in radical
political contention in the late 1970s were first legalized in the 1960s and
came from strategic economic and governmental sectors that benefited
from their power to disrupt public services and economic activity such
as the nation’s ports, electricity, water, transportation, judicial, and ed-
ucational systems (Montgomery 1982). Beginning in 1976, the three largest
revolutionary organizations created clandestine labor-organizing com-
mittees within the existing union infrastructure to coordinate disruptive
labor actions (which often included wildcat strikes and factory occupa-
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tions) across different work sites (Molina Are´valo 1988; Guidos Ve´jar
1990).
Educational sector organizations.—As political opportunities con-
tracted, public school teachers’ associations and high school– and uni-
versity-based organizations endured. ANDES-21 officially counted a na-
tional dues-paying membership of 4,000 in 1974 and 5,500 in 1975
(ANDES-21 1974; Makofsky 1978). By the late 1970s, ANDES-21 had
the organizational capacity to mobilize 15,000–18,000 teachers nationally
for work stoppages and strikes. Growth in university enrollment continued
through the 1970s. Indeed, El Salvador university enrollment rates were
the second highest in Latin America between 1965 and 1975 (Wickham-
Crowley 1989). By 1979, the university student population soared to
26,000 (where as recently as 1960 only 2,200 university students were
enrolled) (Ministerio de Economia 1981). However, the government vio-
lated the autonomy it had allowed in the 1960s by occupying the university
on three separate occasions (1972, 1976, and 1980) and imposing its own
governance structure in 1973 (CAPUES). Nonetheless, Salvadoran uni-
versities persisted as a central source of challenger organizational re-
cruitment throughout the 1970s, with all five competing mass revolu-
tionary organizations counting at least one university (and high school)
student protest organization in its ranks.
Church sector organizations.—The Catholic Church had created a suc-
cessful template for organizing the rural sector in the late 1960s and early
1970s under the protection of the state-sanctioned peasant cooperative
program and support from the Christian Democratic Party. Peasant train-
ing centers, cooperatives, retreat bases, workshops, and monthly news-
letters all demonstrated the ongoing commitment of the Catholic Church
to the rural poor.
Already, in the late 1960s and early 1970s in regions around Suchitoto,
Aguilares, Ilopango, Ciudad Arce, Quezaltepeque, San Salvador, San An-
tonio Abad, Ayutuxtepeque, Mejicanos, Zacamil, Guazapa, Cojutepeque,
Los Ranchos, La Palma, Chalatenango, Tecoluca, and Gotera, religious
experiments were under way in the form of the CCBs (Rivera Damas
1977). This work was carried out in rural parishes (and in some urban
shantytowns), beginning during the period of expanded political oppor-
tunity. It built on the church’s preexisting cooperative program (FUN-
PROCOOP), which grew to 15,000 members in 1976 (Justicia y Paz,
October 1976). It was further promoted by the 1970 Semana Pastoral,
whereby the church encouraged the formation of CCBs to promote the
principles stipulated in Vatican II (1962–65) and the 1968 Medellı´n bish-
ops’ conference—the Latin American church’s official call to actively
“accompany” the region’s poor in their pursuit of social and economic
justice (Ca´ceres Prendes 1989; Smith 1991).
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Vega (1994) reports an estimated 50,000–60,000 Salvadorans partici-
pating in hundreds of CCBs by the mid-1970s, and the monthly newsletter
for rural CCBs, Justicia y Paz, circulating between 6,000 and 8,000 copies
of each issue in the period from 1972 to 1979. The monthly newsletter
highlighted the state’s responsibility regarding inflation, land access, and
political persecution in a format in which semiliterate peasants could easily
identify (e.g., use of the peasant vernacular, peasant narration, discussion
questions, and humor with cartoon caricatures; see app. B for an example
of a 1974 issue of Justicia y Paz attributing responsibility for carrying
out land reform and maintaining viable prices to the state). The seven
church-based peasant training centers founded around the country be-
tween 1968 and 1972 also continued teaching organizational and lead-
ership skills until they were shut down by state repression in 1980 (Pe-
terson 1997).
Many of El Salvador’s top peasant organization leaders and recruiters
in the 1970s, such as Apolinario Serrano of the Christian Federation of
Salvadoran Peasants (FECCAS) and Justo Mejı´a of the Union of Rural
Workers (UTC), began their political careers as Christian base community
and cooperative leaders in the late 1960s (Rivera Damas 1977; Alvarado
Lo´pez and Cruz Olmedo 1978; Cabarru´s 1983; Pearce 1986; Cardenal
1987). In short, the early organizational work of the Catholic Church (and
the Christian Democratic Party) in promoting rural cooperatives, peasant
organizations, Christian base communities, youth groups, peasant training
centers, and community organizing in the late 1960s and early 1970s
endured into a vast recruitment pool for more radical and revolutionary
organizations in the late 1970s (though this was certainly not the intention
of the original founders).
The organizational infrastructure was thus firmly established even after
political opportunities had faded. This increased the probability of sub-
sequent rounds of mobilization motivated by new environmental stimuli
such as state-attributed threats. These kinds of negative environmental
incentives occurred with greater frequency by the mid-1970s. Threat-
induced mobilization, though, was a time-dependent process as challeng-
ers reinterpreted their environment and radicalized preexisting organi-
zational structures and strategies.
Threats, 1972–81
The mid-1970s witnessed the return of higher levels of threat in the Sal-
vadoran political environment. By 1974, the world economic slowdown
and rising international petroleum prices initiated high rates of consumer
inflation, exacerbating land access tensions in the countryside. The closing
of competitive elections improved the likelihood that the Salvadoran state
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would return to an institutional legacy of denying basic civil rights and
applying repression to real and suspected opponents of its authoritarian
rule. At first, the entire organizational infrastructure was knocked off
balance in trying to respond to a changing and contradictory political
environment (e.g., elections with fraud). Over time, though, as the state
moved onto a consistent trajectory of increasing threats, challengers rad-
icalized their leftover organizational infrastructure.
Already, in 1976, one could observe in speeches, street demonstrations,
and written propaganda by oppositional organizations the litany of ref-
erences to skyrocketing inflation, the electoral frauds of 1972 and 1974,
and rural state massacres in Chinamequita (April–May 1974), La Caye-
tana (November 1974), Tres Calles (June 1975), Hacienda Santa Barbara
(October 1975), and the killing of university students in the capital (July
1975). Thus, increasing threats were not just objective changes in the
political environment but were also actively interpreted and attributed to
the state by regime challengers (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).
A political pamphlet distributed in January 1976 from one of the largest
mass-based extraparliamentary organizations (FAPU) synthesizes the per-
ception of mounting threats:
The Unified Popular Action Front (F.A.P.U.), since its formation in June
1974, has been proposing to the Salvadoran people the necessity to sustain
an energetic and combative struggle against the high cost of living in the
economic sphere and against the Molina military dictatorship’s fascist es-
calation in the political sphere; these are the tasks of the moment, the
immediate struggles. . . . We are all witnesses to the relentless increase in
the cost of basic necessities (food, clothing, shoes, medicine, etc.) as we are
witnesses to the increasing shameless repression that the government un-
leashes against the population; it’s enough to remember the peasant mas-
sacres in Chinamequita, La Cayetana, Tres Calles, etc; the savage slaughter
of students on July 30, 1975; the assassination and capture of many union
leaders that in one form or another contribute to the Salvadoran working-
class struggle. These two social processes (the economic crisis and the in-
crease in antipopular repression) are marked within a process of fascist
escalation that since 1972 has been developing in the womb of our society.
(FAPU 1976, p. 1; author’s translation)
The above litany of economic and repressive threats attributed to the
state, as acting against the labor, educational, and church-organized peas-
ant sectors, slowly radicalized the challenger organizational infrastructure
created in the 1960s as such processes intensified and repeated themselves
on an expanding scale. By 1977, challengers radicalized the leftover or-
ganizational infrastructure to the point that the increasingly threatening
environment fueled more disruptive and violent forms of contention. Un-
derlying this new round of mobilization stood the specific threat incentives
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of state-attributed economic problems, the erosion of rights, and state
repression.
State-attributed economic problems.—By 1974, the global economic re-
cession plagued El Salvador with high imported fuel prices and infla-
tionary pressures. Table 3 shows the consumer price index for the years
between 1958 and 1979. Real wages also declined for manufacturing work-
ers in the 1970s as unemployment increased, intensifying the effects of
consumer inflation (Dunkerley 1982; Argueta Antillo´n 1983; Booth 1991;
Kirby 1992; Smith 1996). In contrast, during the 1960s, El Salvador had
experienced the lowest consumer inflation rates in Latin America (Shea-
han 1990). Already, by 1974, pressuring the government to implement
price controls on basic consumer goods was a major demand of regime
challengers (Cabarru´s 1983). In 1975, the leading Catholic figure in the
country, Archbishop Monsignor Luis Cha´vez y Gonza´lez, released his
Fiftieth Pastoral Letter (“La Inflacio´n en El Salvador ante la Concien-
cia Cristiana”), urging the government to take measures to reduce infla-
tion on basic consumer items and land rents (Alas 1982; Vega 1997; see
app. B).
Besides price increases, land access was another state-attributed eco-
nomic problem becoming more acute with over 40% of rural families
classified as landless in 1975 and up to 65% in 1980 (Kirby 1992; Williams
1986)—up from 12% in 1962 (Cabarru´s 1983) and less than 8.6% in 1950
(Castellanos 2001). The land situation was compounded in the early 1970s
by the forced repatriation of 130,000 Salvadoran peasants from Honduras
as a result of the Soccer War (Durham 1979).10 Nearly 60% of the pop-
ulation lived in rural areas at the time. Land access increasingly became
a state-attributed problem for peasants in the 1970s because of failed
government attempts to implement an agrarian reform on two separate
and highly publicized occasions in January of 1970 and the summer of
1976 (Vega 1994). Ethnographic fieldwork in church-organized rural zones
in the 1970s (e.g., northern San Salvador, Cuscatla´n, San Vicente, and
Chalatenango) consistently reports land access and inflation as central
peasant grievances (Rodrı´guez 1976; Durham 1979; Samaniego 1980; Ca-
barru´s 1983; Pearce 1986; Cardenal 1987; Paige 1996; Hammond 1998;
see app. B). In brief, consumer price increases and land access acted as
major state-attributed economic problems pushing well-networked urban
and rural groups into sustained collective action by the mid-1970s. Often,
land access issues were the source of rural unrest that led to the first
10 The Soccer War was a five-day military conflict between El Salvador and Honduras
in July 1969 that resulted in 3,000–4,000 deaths; the hostilities were in part related to
Salvadoran immigration to Honduras and inequities within the Central American
Common Market.
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TABLE 3
Consumer Price Index in El Salvador, 1958–79
Year General Index Food Housing Clothing
Other
Consumer
Goods
1958 . . . 107.7 108.7 119.1 83.9 112.3
1962 . . . 104.1 105.3 98.9 88.7 117.9
1966 . . . 106.8 107.6 102.6 91.7 120.5
1972 . . . 116.3 124 107.8 85.4 125
1973 . . . 123.7 133.3 115.9 87.9 129.7
1974 . . . 144.6 156.4 137.7 95.9 153
1975 . . . 172.2 188.5 163.5 123.7 167.5
1976 . . . 184.4 201.6 177.8 138.1 172.2
1977 . . . 206.1 219.1 205 150.5 210.5
1978 . . . 233.5 242.5 251.8 163.8 240.9
1979 . . . 280 287.3 294.9 229.9 285.8
Source.—Lo´pez (1983, p. 165).
Note.—Based on June 1954 standard of living for urban workers (1954 p 100).
government massacres in the mid-1970s, such as in the community of La
Cayetana, San Vicente Department.
Erosion of rights.—Citizenship rights eroded throughout the 1970s. Ta-
ble 4 illustrates the eroding electoral process between 1972 and 1978. In
contrast to the late 1960s and early 1970s, challenger organizations had
little protection from inside the polity to defend their interests. In addition,
the state intermittently implemented a series of quasi-martial laws
throughout the 1970s (e.g., spring 1972, part of 1977, all of 1978, early
1979, and the second half of 1980). These declarations of special states
of emergency denied a number of constitutional rights such as public
assembly, the right to associate, right to habeas corpus, and public dissent.
In effect, the state outlawed many of the orderly forms of protest used in
the 1967–72 protest wave, providing a disincentive for their continued
use.
Between mid-1972 and 1981 there was an erosion in the state’s com-
mitment to binding consultation with civil society. By mid-1976 Salva-
doran citizens no longer elected their own representatives in the legislative
and executive branches. This shift in state practices encouraged previously
organized challengers to radicalize their organizational forms as institu-
tionalized channels to press demands closed. Indeed, many of El Salva-
dor’s senior revolutionary leaders in the 1970s and 1980s date their in-
corporation into more radical organizations to the 1972 fraudulent
elections (see McClintock 1998 for multiple cases). In turn, the national
government now demonstrated much less restraint in implementing re-
pression against its opponents.
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TABLE 4
Erosion of National Elections, 1972–78
Election Outcome
1972 presidential elections . . . . . . . . . . . Government fraud. Military party (PCN) re-
mains in power.
1972 parliamentary elections . . . . . . . . . Electoral Commission refuses to certify opposi-
tion candidates in San Salvador, San Miguel,
Sonsonate, and Usuluta´n. Opposition parties
in San Salvador have supporters deface bal-
lots, resulting in a majority of null votes.
Electoral Commission refuses to acknowledge
a majority of null votes and hold new elec-
tions as called for in its own electoral code.
Government allows UNO 8 seats in 52-mem-
ber parliament.
1974 parliamentary elections . . . . . . . . . Reported government fraud. No official/public
release of vote count. Government allows 15
opposition seats in parliament.
1976 parliamentary elections . . . . . . . . . Opposition parties boycott elections after Elec-
toral Commission impedes the registration of
two-thirds of their candidates. For the first
time since 1964, the parliament returns to
one-party rule, with all 52 seats taken by the
official military party.
1977 presidential elections . . . . . . . . . . . Reported government fraud. Legal opposition
sent into exile after elections, government
massacre of opposition supporters in San
Salvador.
1978 parliamentary elections . . . . . . . . . Opposition boycotts elections. Official military
party retains all 52 parliamentary seats.
State repression.—By the mid-1970s a shift took place in state–civil
society relations. The government became more repressive, harassing,
exiling, and even killing leaders of the electoral opposition and firing live
ammunition at demonstrators during relatively peaceful urban and rural
protests.11 The rising number of massacres in the mid-1970s clearly in-
11 In 1972 martial law was declared from March 25 until April 10 and then extended
until June 2, in response to a failed coup attempt. During the first three weeks of the
martial law period, at least 22 civilians were killed (most of whom were associated in
some way to the electoral opposition) by agents linked to the state (Morales Velado et
al. 1988). On July 19, 1972, the military occupied the national university (UES) on all
three campuses, which resulted in 800 student and faculty arrests and the banishment
of the administration (including the rector) into exile in Nicaragua. The UES was shut
down for over an entire year until September 1973 (after which the government in-
stalled intimidating security agents inside; the students called them “verdes” for their
olive militarylike uniforms). In September 1972, the government sent 21 union and
opposition party members into exile (Morales Velado et al. 1988). Then again, in
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dicated a greater willingness by military state managers in the employment
of repression against organized challengers.
UNO opposition deputies attempted to initiate parliamentary investi-
gations of both the La Cayetana peasant massacre in 1974 and a university
student massacre in 1975. The military party–controlled legislative as-
sembly rebuffed their efforts on two separate occasions. State repression
continued to escalate in the late 1970s. A pattern of “disappearing” (forced
abduction in which the subsequent whereabouts of the victims are un-
known to relatives) suspected political activists emerged after 1975. By
1979 Salvadoran security forces and associated paramilitary groups were
responsible for dozens of political deaths per month. During 1980 and
1981, when state repression peaked, security forces and paramilitaries
reportedly killed an average of nearly 1,000 civilians per month. Human
rights data available on arrests, torture, and other forms of state-sponsored
abuse also show a marked annual increase between 1973 and 1981 (see
fig. 4).
There was a gradual ratcheting up of state repression throughout the
1970s. Reformist political parties and challenger organizations were the
first targets of repression, and the state intermittently exiled, killed, or
“disappeared” some of their members. By the late 1970s, repression was
becoming much more intensive and continuous. Across segments of the
labor, educational, and church-organized sectors, activists (suspected and
real) were increasingly detained, tortured, killed, and/or disappeared
(Stanley 1996). Human rights abuse records indicate that it was precisely
these three organized sectors (i.e., unionized workers; students and
ANDES-affiliated teachers; and church-organized peasants and religious
workers) that bore the brunt of state repression in terms of their over-
representation among the occupational statuses of the victims listed (So-
corro Jurı´dico Cristiano 1981; Delgado Tobar and Pen˜a Rosales 1989).
Since the state opted for a gradual escalation of repression approach over
January 1973, 18 more dissidents were exiled. Increasingly, by the middle of the 1970s
state repression was targeted not only against UNO supporters, unions, the UES, and
other urban sectors but also against the Catholic Church and the church-organized
peasantry. On April 30, 1974, the security forces killed at least four people protesting
electoral fraud in the rural town of Chimanequita, La Paz. On November 29, 1974,
six peasants were massacred in La Cayetana, San Vicente, by the National Guard.
During the operation an additional 25 peasants were arrested, out of which 13 “dis-
appeared.” On June 2, 1975, 40 soldiers and members of the paramilitary patrol OR-
DEN reportedly killed four peasants in Tres Calles, Usuluta´n. On July 30, 1975, the
National Guard killed as many as 37 UES students during a peaceful march in San
Salvador. On September 26, 1975, a UDN member of parliament (and FUSS labor
leader) was murdered by a death squad. In October 1975, the National Guard fired
on striking farmworkers on Santa Barbara Estate in Chalatenango, killing at least
two peasants, disappearing four, and injuring many others (Latin American Bureau
1977; Socorro Jurı´dico Cristiano 1981).
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Fig. 4.—Reported number of political disappearances and homicides by government and
paramilitary groups 1966–81, and reported illegal detentions and tortures, 1973–81. (Data
are drawn from Socorro Jurı´dico Cristiano 1981, 1984; Morales Velado et al. 1988; La Prensa
Gra´fica; IDHUCA 1997; Ball 2000; Latin American Bureau 1977; Anaya Montes 1972.)
the decade, it failed to dismantle the organizational infrastructure founded
in the liberalizing 1960s and rapidly radicalizing in the 1970s.
From Opportunity Organizations to a Radicalized Organizational
Infrastructure
The key supporting institutions and challenger organizations in the labor,
educational, and church sectors that cohered into an organizational in-
frastructure in the liberalizing 1960s persisted in the transitioning political
environment in the mid-1970s. While the government sporadically at-
tempted to disband or impede the continuance of challenger organizations
(by such threatening actions as occupying the national university and
intimidating urban unions and church-organized peasant communities),
the process of widening political opportunity in the 1960s made it difficult
to control the rich array of organizations now available to challenging
groups. Indeed, efforts by the state to dismantle the organizational infra-
structure led more often to radicalizing it. The radicalization of organi-
zations was a time-dependent process as the state responded to orderly
protest against various threats by ignoring challengers or repressing them.
In turn, the labor movement, educational sector, and church-based groups
used their organizations and established relationships to sustain the rad-
icalizing organizational infrastructure. Hence, the revolutionary organi-
zations emerging in the mid-1970s were clearly stamped by the political
opportunity organizations created in the late 1960s (see table 5).
Table 5 lists the largest and most important extraparliamentary and
revolutionary organizations to emerge in El Salvador in the mid-1970s.
The table demonstrates a clear dynamic in which organizations, leaders
and participants from the 1967–72 protest wave founded more radical
and revolutionary organizations in the 1970s. Once established, the new
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TABLE 5
Political Opportunity Organizations and Their Radicalization into El Salvador’s Revolutionary Organizational
Infrastructure, 1972–81
Radical Organization
and Year Formed
1967–72 Political Opportunity Organizations
Labor-Sector
Opportunity Organizations
Educational-Sector
Opportunity Organizations
Church-Sector
Opportunity Organizations
Popular Forces of Liberation
(FPL) (1970–72)
Formed by leaders of FUSS
(which launched strike wave of
1967)
Some ANDES-21 leaders align
with the FPL in mid-1970s;
University students from the
UES form initial cells of FPL
Early members also come out of
high school and university
Catholic organizations (JEC
and FRUSC)
People’s Revolutionary Army
(ERP) (1972)
UES students form initial cells Some early members also partici-
pated in high school and uni-
versity Catholic organizations
(JEC and FRUSC) and Chris-
tian Democratic youth
movement
Unified Popular Action Front
(FAPU) (1974)
FUSS and FESTIAVTCES par-
ticipate in the founding of
FAPU, later strengthened by al-
liance with FENASTRAS (a
large break-off labor federation
from Catholic UNOC and pro-
government CGS)
ANDES-21, Catholic University
students and UES students par-
ticipate in the founding of
FAPU
Initially founded by Christian
base communities in Suchitoto
and by FECCAS
Union of Rural Workers
(UTC) (1974)
Early members come from Catho-
lic Cooperative Movement
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National Resistance (RN)
(1975)
Break-off of ERP-UES students Some members of Catholic Youth
Organizations (JEC)
Popular Revolutionary Bloc
(BPR) (1975)
Founded by ANDES-21, Catholic
University students, UES stu-
dents, high school students
Members of FECCAS, Christian
base community priests, and
church/Christian Democrat–or-
ganized slum dwellers partici-
pate in founding
Revolutionary Party of Central
American Workers (PRTC)
(1976)
UES students (leaders in 1970 ar-
eas comunes student strike,
ANDES-21 leaders)
Some early leaders work in Chris-
tian Democratic community ac-
tion program
Popular Leagues “28th of Feb-
ruary” (LP-28) (1977)
Formed largely by UES students Some participation of Christian
base communities connected to
peasant training center in east-
ern El Salvador.
Popular Liberation Movement
(MLP) (1979)
Formed by 1960s leaders of teach-
ers’ union ANDES-21 and for-
mer rector of National Univer-
sity in the 1960s
Sources.—Alas (1982); Henriquez (1988); Cienfuegos (1993); Harnecker (1993); Ueltzen (1994); McClintock (1998); Binford (1999).
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radical organizations secured continued support from the preexisting or-
ganizational infrastructure (i.e., political opportunity organizations) in
terms of resources, bloc and individual recruitment, and protection. The
labor, educational, and church-based sectors each contributed organiza-
tional resources and/or cadre to the radicalizing organizational infrastruc-
ture of the mid to late 1970s.
Three of the most prominent and high-ranking FUSS labor leaders who
directed the 1967 progressive general strike founded the radical revolu-
tionary organization Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) in the early 1970s.
Arguably, the most important revolutionary leader in the 1970s and trade
union leader in the 1960s, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, describes labor
activists abandoning the FUSS leadership in the early 1970s in order to
construct the FPL:
The most clear-sighted people, who at that moment understood the needs
of the revolutionary struggle in our country, had to withdraw from the
organizations to which they had virtually devoted their lives, with a great
deal of pain but with great realism in taking the step. . . . To do so it was
necessary to leave posts of great responsibility and honor in those other
organizations. Several of our members who later joined the Farabundo
Martı´ People’s Liberation Forces as founding members were esteemed lead-
ers of the workers’ movement. For instance, Jose´ Dimas Alas was the
secretary general of the Labor Unity Federation [FUSS] and one of its
founders; Comrade Ernesto Morales was the youth secretary of the same
Federation: and there were others who were also labor leaders who had to
leave the traditional organizations to be able to develop in the new revo-
lutionary school. (Tricontinental Society 1980, p. 25)
The revolutionary leaders sustained their new radical organizations
by recruiting from the national university, teachers’ union, and church-
organized student and peasant sectors (Harnecker 1993). The public school
teachers’ association (ANDES-21) united other social sectors, including
peasants, shantytown dwellers, and students, into common radical or-
ganizations such as the Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR). ANDES-21
leaders from the 1960s also played a major role in the formation of the
mass revolutionary organization MLP (Alas 1982). University of El Sal-
vador student leaders from the 1970 Areas Comunes strike committee
were central actors in founding the revolutionary organizations ERP, RN,
and PRTC (McClintock 1998).
From the church-organized sector, Christian base community members
and priests initiated the formation of the mass-based extraparliamentary
organization the Unified Popular Action Front (FAPU) in 1974 and par-
ticipated in the forming of the Popular Revolutionary Bloc in 1975. Both
of these mass radical organizations were officially inaugurated in churches
(Montgomery 1982; Pearce 1986). The Catholic-based student organiza-
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tions (JEC, FRUSC, and PDC youth) that formed in the 1960s also con-
tributed to the ERP, RN, and FPL some of their early and/or founding
revolutionaries (Henriquez 1988; Harnecker 1993). The church’s organ-
izing efforts were so successful that the secular Marxist-Leninist revolu-
tionary organization, the (FPL), bent ideological protocol and distributed
a special pamphlet in 1974 inviting the Christian community to join the
revolutionary struggle. Without this modification, revolutionary leaders
confessed it would have been “impossible” to align with parts of the
church-organized peasant sector (Harnecker 1993, p. 128).12
One movement leader, active in both the BPR and the UTC, illustrates
through his personal account the role of the 1960s organizational infra-
structure in subsequent radical organizational participation in the mid-
1970s. He first describes the sequence of opportunity organizations that
he and fellow peasants passed through in the Chalatenango region before
they joined the revolutionary movement in the 1970s:
I arrived to the [revolutionary] movement through two paths . . . one path,
because I was an activist in the Christian Democratic Party since I was
very young, and, later, by the cooperative movement sponsored by the
Church in which I also participated. Through this route I began to link
myself with peasant organizations. This was also the history for the majority
of us. Many of us came from the ranks of the Christian Democratic Party,
we were people that had lost all hope in finding an alternative solution
through this political party; we were people that had developed our human
and social consciousness through the Christian movement. (Harnecker 1993,
pp. 153–54; see also McClintock 1998, p. 258)
This same activist then discusses why preorganized groups left over from
the 1967–72 organizational infrastructure were targeted for partial ap-
propriation by more radical organizations in the mid-1970s:
We had the ability to sense that we should not try and work with whatever
social sector, but only the most receptive ones. We did not search out or
collaborate with workers in general, nor with peasants in general, but we
had already begun working openly with ANDES, the teachers’ organiza-
tion, that was the most combative organization in the early 1970s. Their
experience demonstrated to us that we could expand the movement and
that is what happened. ANDES played, in fact, an extremely important
role in the organization of peasants and high school students, the students
were another very receptive sector. . . . The same thing occurred in the
countryside. The situation was explosive because of the crisis it was ex-
12 Henriquez (1988) further suggests that radical organizations such as the BPR would
not likely have been able to penetrate urban shantytown communities (los tugurios)
in the mid-1970s without the preestablished organizational work of the Catholic
Church and Christian Democratic Party in these same areas in the late 1960s and
early 1970s.
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periencing in terms of the scarcity of land in which to work, credit and
material for production, commercialization of production, and low salary
levels during the harvesting season. In the countryside there were a lot of
expressions of spontaneous mass rebellion. We were convinced that the
peasantry was another sector ripe for organization, for mobilization. The
university sector was another receptive group. . . . In reference to the work
with the peasantry, our [revolutionary] organization began to influence the
Christian Federation of Salvadoran Peasants (FECCAS) directed in this
period by the Christian Democrats and the Catholic Church. (Harnecker
1993, pp. 125–26; see also Grenier 1999, pp. 45, 137, and 178 n. 28)
The early revolutionaries realized the stakes of operating in a high-risk/
threat environment and substantially cut their organizing costs by search-
ing out the specific social sectors already organized (i.e., the most “recep-
tive” or “ripe” sectors) from the 1967–72 protest wave, as opposed to trying
to collaborate with “whatever social sector” or with workers and peasants
“in general.” The ability of revolutionary challengers to partially appro-
priate the leftover organizational infrastructure is due to the fact that they
came out of it themselves and continued ongoing interorganizational re-
lationships (Grenier 1999). Indeed, by the mid-1970s, many leaders and
organizers maintained multiple overlapping memberships in trade union,
student, or peasant organizations while simultaneously participating in
more clandestine revolutionary organizations (see Harnecker 1993 for
multiple accounts).
Threats penetrated the labor, educational, and church-based sectors to
such a degree by the mid-1970s that key radical organizations formed
and/or named themselves in direct response to specific threatening events.
Four out of the nine principal radical/revolutionary organizations listed
in table 5 mark their origins to specific threats. The first mass-based
radical organization, FAPU, was formed in June 1974 to struggle against
the threats of price increases, state repression, and fraudulent elections
(Alas 1982; Montgomery 1982; Cardenal 1987).13 FAPU was a coalition
of labor, education, and church-based organizations founded during the
institutional opening in the 1960s; it included the teachers’ union ANDES-
21, the labor federations FUSS and FESTIAVTCES, Christian base com-
munities (CCBs) from Suchitoto, the church- and PDC-organized peasant
league FECCAS, along with young clerics and university students. A
similar coalition of opportunity holdover organizations formed the largest
extraparliamentary organization in August 1975—the Popular Revolu-
tionary Bloc (BPR)—in response to a government massacre of university
13 One of FAPU’s first campaigns was to press the state to develop an anti-inflationary
policy (Cabarru´s 1983). Consumer goods prices rose rapidly between 1974 and 1977
for such basic items as cooking oil, rice, red beans, cheese, and bus fares (Ministerio
de Economia 1978).
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students on July 30, 1975. By the late 1970s, FAPU and BPR served as
focal organizational units in which thousands of workers, students, teach-
ers, and church-organized peasants could unite by linking their respective
subunit challenger organizations under a single organizational umbrella.
At the end of 1974, a major radical peasant organization was formed
out of the church-based cooperative movement in San Vicente and Cha-
latenango within weeks of the La Cayetana massacre—the Union of Rural
Workers (UTC) (Pearce 1986; Berryman 1987). Another radical organi-
zation, the Popular Leagues “28th of February” (LP-28), named itself in
homage to the victims of a state massacre of a massive nonviolent dem-
onstration in downtown San Salvador protesting government fraud on
February 28, following the 1977 presidential elections (between 50 and
100 people were killed). LP-28 and BPR also titled many of their affiliated
subunit organizations after the exact dates of repressive events (e.g., mil-
itary occupation of the university and 1975 student massacre) or after the
names of fellow members killed by the security forces; these served as
rallying cries for future mobilization and organizational recruitment.
In contrast to the reformist late 1960s, challenger interpretations of the
political environment that emerged by the mid-1970s were much more
antisystemic. The Salvadoran state was no longer viewed as a relatively
legitimate jurisdictional body in which to present claims for new advan-
tages and benefits. Rather, the state was now viewed by opponents as
economically harmful, exclusive, and repressive. Military state managers
were seen as unworthy of ruling and serving only the narrow interests of
the agro-export elite, as evidenced by their inability to implement land
reform (Stanley 1996; Griffith and Gonza´lez 2002), reduce inflation, con-
voke competitive elections, or tolerate public dissent.14 These emerging
perceptions generated much more radical organizing strategies whereby
coercive actions and tactics (e.g., building, factory, and land occupations
and barricade construction) were encouraged to seek political influence
in the increasingly threatening political environment.
By 1977, the challenger organizational infrastructure had been radi-
calized, as measured by the higher ratio of revolutionary organizations
to reformist organizations present in protest events (see fig. 5). The dom-
inance of revolutionary organizations in the social movement sector pro-
vided a “tipping point” (Petersen 2001) where increasing threats triggered
a much more disruptive and violent protest wave between 1977 and 1981.
14 After 1976, the credibility of the regime had fallen to such a low level that virtually
no protests targeted the legislative branch of government, as opposed to about 20%
of protests during the 1967–72 protest wave. In a public opinion survey of 335 Sal-
vadoran citizens in the mid-1980s, only 8% of respondents believed that General
Romero came to power in 1977 through free elections (Morales Velado et al. 1988).
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Fig. 5.—Quarterly presence of reformist and revolutionary challenger organizations in
protest events, 1962–81. Reformist organizations were coded as those organizations that had
reformist goals (i.e., group-specific policy changes) and did not make claims for the overthrow
of the state. Revolutionary organizations were coded as all organizations that were explicitly
revolutionary and/or extraparliamentary with the replacement of the government as a central
goal (i.e., the revolutionary organizations listed in table 5, their affiliates, and guerrilla
organizations). (Source: La Prensa Gra´fica 1962–81)
Threat-Induced Protest Wave, 1977–81
Regime challengers modified their organizational infrastructure in this
period by changing their strategy from reformist organizations to radical
and revolutionary organizations as the political system slowly shut down
following the fraudulent 1972 presidential and parliamentary elections
(see fig. 5). Several indicators of contentious activity, including total pro-
tests and strikes, show a marked decline between 1973 and 1976 (see figs.
1 and 2) as challengers reinterpreted the changing political environment
and radicalized their organizational infrastructure. In 1977 a second pro-
test wave ascended, reaching more than 1,000 protest events a year by
1980. This second protest cycle exhibited much more disruptive and vi-
olent properties, nearly overthrowing the regime between 1980 and 1981.
By 1977, revolutionary-based organizations acquired the capacity to
mobilize frequent protest events in response to escalating threats. The
most publicized and notorious acts of human rights violations and state
repression—such as the July 30, 1975, student massacre, the February 28,
1977, massacre of UNO supporters protesting electoral fraud, and the
assassination of Father Rutilio Grande in March 1977 (a popularly sup-
ported Jesuit organizing CCBs)—were each immediately followed by large
demonstrations in repudiation and then commemorated annually with
massive homage ceremonies. Other rights-violating and repressive acts,
such as arrests of organizational leaders or the violent dispersion of street
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demonstrations, led to more coercive tactics that included building oc-
cupations (especially churches, embassies, and government offices) to de-
mand the release of political prisoners and the whereabouts of the “dis-
appeared.” Revolutionary organizations also increasingly launched armed
attacks on the state security forces.
Figure 2 demonstrates the widespread employment of mass disruptive
protest and violence during the second wave (1977–81) of political con-
tention. Between 1979 and 1980 there were 161 reported farm invasions
by organized land-poor peasants. In 1979, nearly half (43%) of the 114
reported labor strikes (see fig. 1) also included factory occupations. At the
peak of the strike wave in 1980, 50% of worker actions demanded higher
wages to match exorbitant inflation rates while another 25% of labor
strikes centered on issues of state repression (Delgado Tobar and Pen˜a
Rosales 1989). In contrast to the nonviolent and orderly 1967–72 protest
wave, over 60% of reported protest events were violent between 1977 and
1981 (see fig. 2). Mass nonviolent and disruptive protests peaked in the
first half of 1980. State repression reached such alarming levels in 1980
that the presence of reformist organizations and mass protest declined
rapidly by the end of the year, while armed attacks by revolutionary
organizations remained high throughout the early 1980s as the country
spiraled into civil war.
Summary
El Salvador’s authoritarian political environment varied considerably in
the mid to late 20th century. The protracted political opening in the 1960s
characterized by institutional access and competitive elections benefited
organizational entrepreneurs in the labor, educational, and church sectors.
During the liberalization period the state and oppositional political parties
actively encouraged the formation of a wide variety of civic organizations
and associations. The result was an organizational infrastructure in which
multiple challenger organizations loosely coalesced, developed ongoing
relations, and pressed the state for new advantages and benefits. This
process culminated in an orderly and nonviolent protest wave where
challengers viewed the liberalizing state as a relatively legitimate juris-
dictional body to which claims could be presented. The wave of dem-
onstrations and strikes that rocked El Salvador between 1967 and 1972
was the longest sustained period of popular contention since the 1932
peasant uprising and state massacre.
The reform-oriented protest wave came to an end when the state held
successive fraudulent presidential and parliamentary elections in 1972.
Even with this closing in opportunities, the organizational infrastructure
founded in the late 1960s endured in both the countryside and cities
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through the 1970s. Few of the key organizations or associations created
in the 1960s were effectively dismantled by the state (i.e., teachers’ union,
labor federations, universities, student groups, and Catholic Church or-
ganizational initiatives) until the height of state repression in 1980 and
1981. In brief, a sustained period of political opportunity deposited an
organizational infrastructure that persisted after opportunities diminished.
From 1972 to 1981 the Salvadoran state gradually became more ex-
clusive and repressive, which combined with state-attributed economic
problems (price increases and land shortage) to create an increasingly
threatening political environment. Responding to these increasing threats,
challenger organizations left over from regime liberalization radicalized.
The decision of military state managers to close down institutionalized
channels of dissent, convoke repeated electoral frauds, and commit out-
rageous acts of state repression motivated regime challengers to adopt
more coercive protest strategies. By 1977 revolutionary organizations had
launched a much wider, disruptive, and violent protest wave eventuating
in El Salvador’s civil war in the 1980s.
DISCUSSION
The case of El Salvador offers insight into a central theoretical puzzle in
current research on protest waves and revolutions in authoritarian con-
texts that employ political process/opportunity models: How is large-scale
rebellion possible in repressive regimes when the most often cited con-
ditions in the political environment are the exact reverse of those asso-
ciated with mass protest in democratic states? For instance, Goodwin
(2001, p. 177) states, “Far from being a response to political openings, the
revolutionary mobilization that occurred in Central America during the
1970s and 1980s was generally a response to political exclusion and violent
repression—the contraction of political opportunities and the closing down
of ‘political space’” (emphasis in the original).
This investigation suggests that the explanation resides in a sequential
model of political opportunity and threat. Such a framework highlights
periods of political liberalization/political opportunity and organization
building before a regime becomes exclusive and repressive. With the ex-
ception of an infusion of resources from elite allies, transnational networks,
or foreign states, it would otherwise be extraordinarily difficult for regime
challengers to establish organizational infrastructures capable of sustained
resistance to authoritarian rule. Political opportunity periods not only
encourage an escalation in orderly forms of protest activities in authori-
tarian settings, as shown in previous research, but also stimulate the
formation of enduring civic organizations. These organizational infra-
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structures persevere in the political environment long after the political
reforms responsible for their establishment fade away.
Originally founded to act as collective vehicles to pursue group interests
in a liberalizing authoritarian regime, these units and their memberships
are likely to radically change goals, strategies, and alliances when the
political environment no longer matches their organizational structures
and endangers their survival. Increasing threats are one set of environ-
mental incentives in which this organizational transformation/radicali-
zation occurs. As a corollary, resistance to mounting threats is unlikely
without the previous buildup and appropriation of an organizational in-
frastructure by regime challengers.
The present study maintains more precisely that the political oppor-
tunity features of regime liberalization periods (state-initiated practices of
institutional access and competitive elections) selectively encourage the
formation of civic organizations in particular social sectors. Future re-
search may want to investigate additionally the role of persisting idea-
tional elements created by prolonged periods of liberalization, such as
notions of entitlements and emergent norms of state–civil society relations.
These nonorganizational forces may also contribute to increased popular
dissent when the state de-democratizes.
A related strategy in this line of study would be to recognize the leading
social sectors participating in mass rebellion against a repressive regime.
Once identified, the organizational genealogy should be traced for these
sectors to determine the political context in which they first originated.
For example, Chile’s urban shantytown dwellers were a key sector dem-
onstrating against the Pinochet military dictatorship in the mid-1980s,
but their organizational founding dates back to the predictatorship period
(1960–73), when there was support from the state and competing electoral
political parties (Schneider 1995). The Front Islamic du Salut (FIS), which
dominated extreme Algerian contention in the 1990s, evolved from a mass-
based electoral party that was denied victory by the state in early 1992
(Martinez 2000). In other words, preceding liberalization periods appear
to generate organizational building blocks for radical challenger groups
operating in more authoritarian contexts. The case of El Salvador offers
one striking example that revolutionary movements in repressive settings
are organizationally constructed from earlier political opportunity periods.
Finally, this article proposes that social movement theories should give
more attention to negative environmental incentives and threats—the un-
derdeveloped side of political process models—as inducements to increase
contentious activity (Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Van Dyke and Soule 2002)
and/or radicalize organizations. However, caution is in order. First, this
study suggests that when threats occur without a preexisting organiza-
tional infrastructure, they will likely deter challengers from sustained
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contention (as in El Salvador between 1932 and the mid-1960s). Second,
not all threats are equivalent. State-attributed economic problems may
lead to increased contention for well-networked groups but probably will
not create radical forms of conflict unless combined with an erosion of
rights and/or state repression. These latter two threats are more often
found in authoritarian states than in democratic ones, making the emer-
gence of mass-based revolutionary movements much more likely in non-
democratic settings (Goodwin 2001). Nonetheless, much more work needs
to be done (in democratic and authoritarian contexts) on the role of po-
litical environments characterized by varying combinations of political
opportunity and threat and how the nature and sequencing of those com-
binations produce particular forms of organization and contention.
APPENDIX A
TABLE A1
List of Acronyms
Acronym Full Name
ACUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Catholic University Action (Accio´n Cato´lica Universitaria
Salvadoren˜a)
AES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Association of Secondary Students (Asociacio´n de los Estu-
diantes de Secundaria)
AGEPYM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . General Association of Public and Municipal Employees
(Asociacio´n General de Empleados Pu´blicos y Municipales)
AGEUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . General Association of Salvadoran University Students (Aso-
ciacio´n General de Estudiantes Universitarios
Salvadoren˜os)
ANDES-21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Association of Salvadoran Educators (Asociacio´n
Nacional de Educadores Salvadoren˜os)
ATACES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Salvadoran Association of Agricultural Workers and Peasants
(Asociacio´n de Trabajadores Agropecuarios y Campesinos
de El Salvador)
BPR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Popular Revolutionary Bloc (Bloque Popular Revolucionario)
CAPUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Provisional Administrative Council of the University (Consejo
de Administracio´n Provisional de la Universidad)
CCB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Christian Base Communities (Comunidades Cristianas de
Base)
CCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Central Elections Commission (Comisio´n Central de las
Elecciones)
CESPROP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Social Studies and Popular Promotion Center (Centro de Es-
tudios Sociales y Promocio´n Popular)
CGBE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . General Council of Student Welfare (Consejo General de Bi-
enestar Estudiantil)
CGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . General Confederation of Salvadoran Unions (Confederacio´n
General Salvadoren˜a)
CGTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers (Confederacio´n
General de Trabajadores Salvadoren˜os)
COAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Workers’ Political Action Committee (Comite´ Obrero de Ac-
cio´n Polı´tica)
CUTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Unitary Confederation of Salvadoran Workers (Confederacio´n
Unitaria de Trabajadores Salvadoren˜os)
ERP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Revolutionary Army of the People (Eje´rcito Revolucionario
del Pueblo)
FAPU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United Popular Action Front (Frente de Accio´n Popular
Unificada)
FECCAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Christian Federation of Salvadoran Peasants (Federacio´n
Cristiana de Campesinos Salvadoren˜os)
FENASTRAS . . . . . . . . . . National Union Federation of Unions of Salvadoran Workers
(Federacio´n Nacional Sindical de Trabajadores
Salvadoren˜os)
TABLE A1 (Continued)
Acronym Full Name
FESINCONTRANS . . . Federation of Construction, Transportation, and Allied Trade
Unions (Federacio´n de Sindicatos de Construccio´n, Trans-
portes y Similares)
FESTIAVTCES . . . . . . . . Federation of Workers in Food, Clothing, Textile, and Re-
lated Industries (Federacio´n Sindical de Trabajadores de la
Industria de Alimentos, Vestidos y Similares de El
Salvador)
FEUR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Revolutionary Front of University Students (Frente Estudian-
tiles Universitarios Revolucionarios)
FIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamic du Salut)
FPL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Popular Forces of Liberation (Fuerzas Populares de
Liberacio´n)
FRUSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Federation of Revolutionary Social Christian University Stu-
dents (Federacio´n Revolucionaria de Universitarios Social
Cristianos)
FSD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Democratic Socialist Front (Frente Socialista Demo´crata)
FUNPROCOOP . . . . . . . . Foundation for the Promotion of Cooperatives (Fundacio´n
Promotora de Cooperativas)
FUSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Unitary Federation of Salvadoran Unions (Federacio´n Uni-
taria Sindical Salvadoren˜a)
IDHUCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Human Rights Institute—Catholic University (Instituto de
Derechos Humanos—Universidad Centroamericana—“Jose
Simeo´n Can˜as”)
INSAFOCOOP . . . . . . . . . Salvadoran Institute to Promote Cooperatives (Instituto Sal-
vadoren˜o de Fomento Cooperativo)
ISS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inter-Diocesan Social Secretariat (Secretariado Social
Interdiocesano)
JAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Catholic Agrarian Youth (Juventud Agraria Cato´lica)
JEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Catholic Student Youth (Juventud Estudiantil Cato´lica)
JOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Catholic Working-Class Youth (Juventud Obrera Cato´lica)
LP-28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Popular Leagues—28th of February (Ligas Populares—28 de
Febrero)
MLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Movement for Popular Liberation (Movimiento de Liberacio´n
Popular)
MNR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacional
Revolucionario)
ORDEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nationalist Democratic Organization (Organizacio´n Democra´-
tica Nacionalista)
PAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Party of Renovating Action (Partido de Accio´n Renovadora)
PCN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Party of National Conciliation (Partido de Conciliacio´n
Nacional)
PCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Communist Party of El Salvador (Partido Comunista de El
Salvador)
PDC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demo´crata Cristiano)
PREN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Republican Party of National Evolution (Partido Republicano
de Evolucio´n Nacional)
PRTC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (Partido
Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centroamericanos)
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TABLE A1 (Continued)
Acronym Full Name
PRUD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unification (Partido Re-
volucionario de Unificacio´n Democra´tica)
RN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional)
SETA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Union of State Water and Aqueduct Workers (Sindicato de
Empresa de Trabajadores de ANDA)
STECEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Union of State Power Workers (Sindicato de Trabajadores de
la Empresa Comisio´n Ejecutiva Ele´ctrica de Rı´o Lempa)
STIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Electrical Workers Union (Sindicato de Trabajadores de In-
dustria Ele´ctrica de El Salvador)
STISSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Social Security Institute Workers Union (Sindicato de Traba-
jadores del Instituto Salvadoren˜o de Seguro Social)
STUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Union of Salvadoran University Workers (Sindicato de Traba-
jadores Universitarios Salvadorenos)
UCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Catholic University (Universidad Centroamericana—Jose´ Si-
meo´n Can˜as)
UCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Communal Union of El Salvador (Unio´n Comunal
Salvadoren˜a)
UDN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Democratic Union (Unio´n Democra´tica
Nacionalista)
UES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National University of El Salvador (Universidad de El
Salvador)
UNO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Opposition Union (Unio´n Nacional Opositora)
UNOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Union of Catholic Workers (Unio´n Nacional de Ob-
reros Cato´licos)
UTC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Union of Rural Workers (Unio´n de Trabajadores del Campo)
APPENDIX B
Political Cartoons
The images in figure B1 are from Justicia y Paz (June 1974, vol. 3, no.
31, p. 11), the monthly newsletter for rural CCBs. At the time these
cartoons appeared (1972–80), there were between 6,000 and 8,000 copies
in circulation each month. The cartoons illustrate the attribution to the
state of land access problems and basic consumer price increases. The
English translations of the texts appear below.
La Vida en broma [Life as a joke]
Bureaucrat: You do not have any more appointments, Mr. Minister . . .
only this peasant who is waiting for the passage of agrarian reform.
Minister: Fine, let him in now. [The minister waits, but the peasant does
not rise to enter the office.]
Bureaucrat: These people are so stupid, they do not have any patience!
The agrarian reform requires much study. [While saying this, the bu-
Fig. B1
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reaucrat removes the sombrero of the peasant to reveal a desiccated
skeleton.]
¿Porque suben los Precios? [Why are prices rising]
Man with moustache: First, some items have to rise in price because they
are imported or made of imported materials.
Man with moustache: Second, other items become expensive because the
manufacturer, the merchant, or the middleman charges whatever they
want.
Clean-shaven man: And why doesn’t the government tighten the screws
on them?
Man with moustache: Our governments come from the political parties
of the wealthy, and the speculators provide a lot of money for those
parties.
Clean-shaven man: And the government is unable to touch them.
Man with moustache: Finally you understand, you dummy! But better
late than never.
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